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1 The inductive case against nominalism
The sciences are full of theories which, in the course of making detailed
claims about the physical world, say things which entail that there are
mathematical entities like numbers and sets. According to an influential
tradition stemming from Quine (1948) and Putnam (1972), good scien-
tific reasoning—induction, broadly construed—requires us to believe some
such theory, or some disjunction of such theories. And it is because of this
that we ought to believe that there are mathematical entities. The belief
that there are numbers is, according to this tradition, on a similar episte-
mological footing to the belief that there are electrons, viruses, quasars,
etc.1
Some will regard this analogy as unhelpful because they think that we
can know that there are mathematical entities in the same way—whatever
it is—that we know that all dogs are dogs, or that all bachelors are unmar-
ried.2 Others may regard this analogy as unhelpful because they think that
we can directly perceive that there are mathematical entities—such as sets of
dogs standing in the street in front of us—just as we can directly perceive
that there are red things; no inductive inference of any sort is required. Still
others will regard the analogy as unhelpful because they think the epis-
1I will not be discussing ‘the indispensability argument for the existence of mathemat-
ical entities’ as such, since I don’t want to get hung up on the interpretation of the key term
‘indispensable’. I hope that the ideas that lie behind this argument will nevertheless get a
fair hearing.
2See, e.g., Wright 1983.
temology of mathematics is sui generis, governed by its own distinctive,
topic-specific norms—maybe just ‘Believe in as many mathematical enti-
ties as you consistently can!’—very different from the topic-neutral norms
that govern inductive reasoning in general.3 On any of these views, the
detour through the empirical sciences is at best unnecessary. Since my aim
in this paper is to evaluate the distinctively inductive reasons for belief in
mathematical entities, I will henceforth presuppose that all these views are
wrong. I will take it for granted that we understand some notion of ‘evi-
dence’, which serves as input to induction, and some notion of ‘deductive
entailment’, which provides background constraints on the beliefs which
are eligible for inductive support. And I will take it for granted that our
evidence does not deductively entail that there are mathematical entities.4
Having internalised this assumption, one does not have to be an induc-
tive sceptic to feel that the inference from evidence about the behaviour of
physical objects to the conclusion that there are numbers or sets—entities
as drastically unlike physical objects as anything could be—is eyebrow-
3See, e.g., Maddy 1997.
4Of course, Quine and Putnam are deeply sceptical about these epistemological cate-
gories. But in practice it is almost impossible to say anything substantive about the way in
which empirical considerations bear on any theoretical question without assuming a back-
ground logic and a background conception of evidence. I hope that even those who regard
our basic logical beliefs or basic perceptual methods as empirically revisable will be able
to accept my assumptions about deductive entailment and evidence, if not as capturing
deep epistemological facts, at least as a useful temporary device marking the distinction
between the beliefs whose epistemic status we are currently trying to assess and the beliefs
we are legitimately taking for granted.
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raisingly audacious, as inductive inferences go. The hypothesis that there
just aren’t any such entities certainly doesn’t feel very like the hypothesis
that there are no electrons—there are no experiments that stand to numbers
as, say, the Millikan oil-drop experiment stands to electrons. It is hard to
get over the impression that someone who insisted on assigning substan-
tial credence to the no-numbers hypothesis would be displaying prudent
caution, rather than any kind of failure of rationality.
It is customary to use the framework of Inference to the Best Explana-
tion (IBE) in setting up questions about what good inductive reasoning
requires in cases like this. Expressed in these terms, the claim that our total
evidence E provides us with good inductive reason to believe that there
are mathematical entities becomes the claim that some theory that entails
that there are mathematical entities is significantly better qua explanation
of E than any theory that doesn’t.5 Even though this framework is rather
creaky, and its relation to our best-developed formal theory of inductive
reasoning (Bayesian conditionalisation) rather obscure, I will go along with
this way of putting things: it seems reasonable to hope that there is some
way of understanding ‘better explanation’ on which the reformulation is
acceptable, though it is a further question what this might have to do with
any meaning of ‘explanation’ we can independently understand. This
framework has the dialectical advantage that it puts the ball in the court
of those who don’t think we have good inductive reasons to believe in
numbers. For we already have a host of platonistic theories (theories that
deductively entail that there are mathematical entities) which seem pretty
good as explanations of large chunks of our evidence. Defenders of nom-
inalism are committed to the claim that there is at least one nominalistic
5I am understanding IBE as the claim that we should believe the theory that best explains
our evidence, assuming it is better than its competitors by a wide enough margin. This is
somewhat different from the Quinean slogan that ‘we should believe our best theories’. The
slogan, perhaps problematically, makes the facts about what we should believe depend on
which theories we have thought of. Couldn’t it happen that although T is the best theory
we have come up with, we should come up with a certain better theory T′, and thus should
not believe T? (Melia (1995) raises related concerns.) But this difference doesn’t end up
mattering much for my purposes. If we could find a workable general strategy for replacing
platonistic theories with nominalist ones that are equally good, on either view we could
conclude that from now on we should not believe in mathematical objects.
(non-platonistic) theory that is as good as (or at least not significantly worse
than) all of these platonistic theories, qua explanation of our evidence. The
challenge is to produce such a theory, or anyway to make it plausible that
one could in principle be formulated.
The most famous response to this challenge is the programme initiated
by Hartry Field in Science Without Numbers (Field 1980). There, Field formu-
lated a version of Newtonian gravitational theory all of whose quantifiers
can be understood as restricted to spacetime points, spacetime regions and
particles. The consequences of Field’s theory for the physical world are
exactly those of the particular platonistic theory it purports to replace.6
Field does not offer a detailed argument that his theory equals or exceeds
that theory in respect of explanatory goodness. But at least it isn’t intu-
itively the sort of theory whose truth would ‘cry out for explanation’. It is
hard to muster up any of the familiar feeling of explanatory satisfaction in
contemplating a putative ‘explanation’ of the truth of Field’s theory that
consists in deriving it from the platonistic theory it aims to supplant.7
Field’s project calls for a lot of hard work. While his methods evidently
generalise far beyond the particular theory he chooses as his model, theories
like general relativity and quantum mechanics pose distinctive challenges
which have yet to be tackled convincingly.8 It is too early to say whether
we can find nominalistic theories in these domains which do as good a job
as Field’s Newtonian theory at providing the intuitive sense of explana-
6This claim is true only for the version of Field’s theory that uses something like second-
order logic to express the idea that there is a region corresponding to every collection of
points. It is not true for the first-order version of Field’s theory (see Burgess and Rosen 1997:
§§II.A.5.b, III.B.1.b). However, the claims about the physical world that follow from the
platonistic theory without following from the first-order version of Field’s theory are quite
esoteric; certainly none of them are part of our evidence. So if we denied the legitimacy of
anything beyond first-order logic, it would be hard to see how the additional consequences
of the platonistic theory for the concrete realm would improve its claim to be well-supported
by our evidence: if anything, the reverse seems more likely to be true.
7On the role of explanatory satisfaction in giving nontrivial content to IBE, see White
2005.
8In the case of quantum mechanics, the process of constructing anything as rigorous
as a Field-style theory will inevitably incorporate some particular rigorous solution to the
measurement problem. For this reason I am not convinced by the treatment in Balaguer
1996, which involves a highly problematic account of measurement in terms of primitive
propensities.
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tory satisfaction while avoiding anything which might strike someone as
a cheap trick. And even if the programme goes as well as could be hoped
in physics, it is a thorny question what additional burden defenders of
nominalism need to meet with regard to the other sciences, and whether
this burden can be met with equal success.
It is thus important to investigate what genuinely epistemic advantages,
if any, all this honest toil has over theft. There are mechanical methods
which take arbitrary platonistic theories as input and output empirically
equivalent, nominalistic replacement theories. The outputs of these al-
gorithms will certainly feel like cheats to those who are used to working
within the constraints that make Field’s programme difficult. But the stakes
are high: we should do our best to subject these gut reactions to critical
scrutiny before we accept them as an accurate guide to the standards of
explanatory goodness.
One important constraint that Field imposes on his theories is that they
make no use of modal operators. If we don’t mind using them, a range of
one-size-fits-all methods for generating nominalistic substitutes for stan-
dard scientific theories becomes available. I will mostly be discussing two
very straightforward methods, although I hope that what I say about the
explanatory goodness of the theories they generate will generalise to many
more sophisticated approaches. The first method embeds the input theory
T in the scope of a restricted possibility operator, as follows:
(T♦) Possibly, the concrete realm is just as it in fact is, and T.
T♦ is just the claim that T is concretely adequate, or consistent with the
totality of truths entirely about the concrete realm.9 ‘The concrete realm
lives up to its side of the T-bargain’ (Balaguer 1998). Or—to put it in a way
that resonates with the tradition of ‘fictionalism’ stemming from Vaihinger
9I take the notion of a proposition ‘entirely about the concrete realm’ to be clear enough
for present purposes. Anti-Humean primitivist realists about laws of nature, counterfac-
tuals, chances etc. should make sure to understand ‘entirely about the concrete realm’ in
such a way that, for example, when the proposition that P and the proposition that Q count
as ‘entirely about the concrete realm’, so do the proposition that it is a law that P, the
proposition that if it were that P it would be that Q, the proposition that it is more likely
that P than that Q, etc.
(1924) and discussed by Putnam (1972: §8)—as far as the concrete realm is
concerned, it is as if T were true.10
The second method requires us first to identify the purely mathematical
component of T, call it M—the conjunction of the purely mathematical
axioms employed by T. Typically with just a little artificiality we can
take M to be something like ZFCU (= Zermelo-Fränkel set theory with
choice + ‘there is a set of all non-sets’).11 Having identified M, we use it
in constructing a restricted necessity operator within which we embed our
input theory T:
(T) Necessarily, if M and the concrete realm is just as it in fact is, then
T.
According to contemporary fictionalists like Yablo (2001, 2005), something
like T captures the ‘real content’ conveyed by ordinary utterances whose
literal content is T: we can think of M as a story—‘the story of standard
mathematics’—and of T as the claim that T is true according to M, taking
the facts entirely about the concrete realm to be ‘imported’ into the story in
the same way that the facts of nineteenth-century geography are imported
in settling what is the case according to the Sherlock Holmes stories. But
even if we reject this hermeneutic claim, we might still conclude that T is
no worse qua explanation of our evidence than T.12
10Strictly speaking, the ‘as if’ claim looks to be a counterfactual conditional: the concrete
realm is as [it would be] if T were true. Formally, this does not follow from T♦, since
‘possibly C and T’ does not logically entail ‘if it were that T, it would be that C’. But in
fact, ‘as if’ claims in these kinds of debates seem to be universally treated as tantamount
to claims like T♦. Since counterfactuals are notoriously context-sensitive, this suggests that
in the relevant contexts, T♦ does suffice for the truth of the counterfactual. In possible-
worlds terms, the contextually relevant closeness relation is such that if there are T-worlds
concretely indiscernible from the actual world, they ipso facto count as closer to the actual
world than any other T-worlds.
11In fact for normal scientific purposes we can get by with theories much weaker than
full ZFCU. See Burgess and Rosen 1997: §I.B.1.b.
12A closely related approach, which arguably does a better job than T at capturing the
intuitive content of the ‘according to the fiction’ claim, uses a counterfactual conditional
instead of a strict one: If M were the case [and the concrete realm were just as it in fact
is], then it would be the case that T (see Dorr 2007: §2; Dorr 2005: §§3–5). The standard
approach to the logic of counterfactuals makes this formally weaker than T: the closest
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Figure 1. Possible-worlds representations of T♦ and T. Points on
the same horizontal line represent concretely indiscernible
worlds.
We can clarify the logical relation between T♦ and T by thinking of them
in terms of possible worlds, although of course those who don’t believe
in abstract entities will not want to take such glosses fully seriously. In
these terms, T♦ is true at a possible world w iff some T-world is concretely
indiscernible from w; T is true at w iff every M-world that is concretely
indiscernible from w is a T-world.13 This is represented in figure 1. As the
figure makes clear, there is no formal guarantee that T♦ and T are true in
the same worlds—for this to be the case, the sets of worlds labelled ‘Region
1’ and ‘Region 3’ would need to be empty. But as we will see in section 3,
in many central cases of interest there is reason to think that these regions
are empty, so that T and T♦ are necessarily equivalent.
Ideally, those who want to deny that we have good inductive reason to
believe in mathematical entities would like to have a general method that
takes an arbitrary theory T as input and yields as output a theory that is
(i) deductively entailed by T;
(ii) empirically equivalent to T, at least in the minimal sense that it
entails every proposition E that is part of our actual evidence and
deductively entailed by T;14
M-and-C worlds could be T-worlds even if not all of them are. However, the counterfactual
formulations introduce new complications, and in practice it is hard to think of any case
where the alleged logical differences between counterfactuals and strict conditionals would
matter.
13We should thus not understand ‘in fact’ as meaning the same as ‘actually’, in the
standard philosopher’s sense, since in that case T♦ and T would, like ‘actually φ’, be
necessary if true. Rather, ‘in fact’ works like the ‘backspace’ operator in Hodes 1984, which
‘undoes’ just one modal operator, so that ^ ↓φ is equivalent to φ, and ^^ ↓φ equivalent to
^φ.
How are we to analyse ‘the concrete realm is just as it in fact is’ in more fundamental
terms? I don’t think we need to answer this question at this stage in the dialectic: we
obviously do understand this expression; if the only way of making nontrivial sense of
this involves quantification over abstract objects of some sort, then we can establish the
existence of such objects by deductive reasoning alone, and there is no point in arguing
further about the inductive route. Nevertheless, note 43 below will consider some possible
nominalistic analyses.
14A more adequate notion of empirical equivalence would take into account probabilistic
relations between theory and evidence short of deductive entailment. For the sake of
simplicity I will ignore this from the main text.
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(iii) nominalistic—deductively consistent with there being no mathe-
matical entities;
(iv) Explanatorily better than, or not significantly worse than, T.
If one had a method that satisfied all four of these desiderata, one could be
assured that belief in mathematical entities could never be licensed by IBE—
we could not justifiably believe some mathematical-entity-entailing T if
there were guaranteed to be a nominalistic competitor of T that was almost
as good qua explanation of our evidence. (Strictly, a theory-transforming
method would not need to satisfy desideratum (i) to achieve this; but a
method’s having this feature will make it easier to argue that it satisfies
desideratum (iv), since it is plausible that a worked-out version of IBE will
give weaker theories, ceteris paribus, an advantage over stronger ones.) My
central concern in this paper is with (iv)—whether the classes of modal
theory-modifying methods whose most straightforward instances are T♦
and T yield good theories as outputs, when given good theories as inputs.
But first, I should say something about how T♦ and T fare with respect
to the first three desiderata. Sections 2 and 3 will sketchily address these
questions for T♦ and T, respectively. These sections will also introduce
some more sophisticated variants of T♦ and T that one might turn to if one
thought that T♦ and T themselves failed in some serious way to satisfy
the desiderata.
The epistemology proper will start in section 4, which will present and
endorse a canonical argument for the explanatory badness of T♦. Sec-
tions 5–7 will consider how this form of argument bears on T. Finally,
section 8 will glance at some other considerations which might suggest that
T is explanatorily bad, and section 9 will canvass some objections.
2 The adequacy of T♦
(i) That T deductively entails T♦ seems obvious: the inference from φ to
pPossiblyφq seems manifestly deductively valid, as does the inference from
anything to ‘the concrete realm is just as it in fact is’.15
15One might deny this on the grounds that deductive reasoning cannot eliminate the
hypothesis that modal concepts are radically defective. But even on the hypothesis of
(ii) Suppose T deductively entails some E which is part of our evidence. It
would follow that T♦ deductively entails E if it were a priori—deductively
entailed by everything—that E is entirely about the concrete realm (cannot
differ in truth-value between concretely indiscernible worlds). For if it is
a priori that E is entirely about the concrete, ‘possibly, the concrete realm
is just as it in fact is and E’ must deductively entail E. Since T entails E,
‘possibly the concrete realm is just as it in fact is and T’ entails ‘possibly,
the concrete realm is just as it in fact is and E’.
How plausible is it that whenever E is part of our evidence, it is a priori
that E is entirely about the concrete? This claim certainly does not follow
from our assumption that our evidence does not deductively entail that
there are mathematical entities. For a believer in mathematical entities
might think that, as a matter of a posteriori necessity, some of the familiar
properties of concrete objects that feature in our evidence (redness, square-
ness, etc.) consist in certain relations holding between concrete objects and
non-concrete ones, which can vary even when all facts entirely about the
concrete are held fixed. Perhaps it is part of our evidence that some ob-
jects are roughly equally long, and what it is for two objects to be roughly
equally long is for a real number close to 1 to bear a certain primitive
“being the ratio of the lengths of” relation to them. Perhaps we cannot
even rule out a priori the even more radical hypothesis that some or all of
the objects of our acquaintance are themselves mathematical objects, as in
the ‘hyper-Pythagorean’ views entertained by Quine (1976) and Tegmark
(2008).
Only on a fairly expansive conception of the scope of ‘deductive en-
tailment’ could such hypotheses be ruled out a priori. Otherwise, T♦ is
empirically equivalent to T only modulo an auxiliary hypothesis that en-
tails, for each E that is part of our evidence, that E is entirely about the
concrete realm. This is a limitation of the modal strategy. But I don’t
think it is a very serious limitation. The auxiliary hypothesis is plausible;
and as far as I can see, none of the standard platonistic scientific theories
that we have reason to take seriously derives any explanatory power from
being consistent with its negation. The only exceptions are the hyper-
such defectiveness, it is more plausible to take ‘possibly’ as inert (so that pPossibly φq is
equivalent to φ) than to reject all possibility claims.
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Pythagorean theories, which achieve a somewhat attractive economy by
entailing that there is nothing more to reality than the mathematical realm;
they will eventually have to be compared on other grounds with the more
familiar kinds of economical world-views available to nominalists.16
(iii) The most important reason to doubt that T♦ is nominalistic derives
from what I will call the necessity thesis: that if there are no mathematical
entities, it is metaphysically necessary that there are no mathematical enti-
ties. If the necessity thesis is a priori (deductively entailed by everything),
and we interpret the modal operator in T♦ as expressing metaphysical pos-
sibility, then T♦ does after all deductively entail that there are mathematical
entities, in virtue of entailing that it is metaphysically possible for there to
be mathematical entities. It is thus useless to the nominalist.
Why might one believe the necessity thesis to be a priori? Most putative
a priori arguments for the necessity thesis that I have come across use forms
of reasoning which, if they worked, would support the stronger claim that
it is metaphysically necessary that there are mathematical entities. Since
we are assuming that the existence of mathematical entities cannot be es-
16What of the probabilistic notion of empirical equivalence mentioned in note 14? For
this, the assumption that our evidence consists of propositions entirely about the concrete
is not enough. We also need the claim that when A is any proposition entirely about the
concrete and P is a conditional probability function representing rational prior credences,
P(A|T) is at least approximately equal to P(A|T♦). It would be question-begging to assume
that this is true for absolutely any T: if we take T to be ‘there are mathematical entities’,
T♦ is trivial, so anyone who thinks that some evidence E entirely about the concrete would
constitute good inductive evidence for the existence of mathematical entities will think
that P(E|T) >> P(E) = P(E|T♦). However, I can see no reason to doubt the assumption
when T is a reasonably specific and detailed scientific theory. Suppose for example that
T is deterministic, so that every proposition is equivalent modulo T to one about initial
conditions. Even those who think that our evidence raises the probability that there are
mathematical entities should still find it plausible that questions about the specific character
of the T-compatible initial conditions are independent of questions about the existence of
mathematical entities. There is a serious case to be made, which we are trying to assess, that
our evidence about the concrete world supports the existence of mathematical entities by
virtue of supporting some theory about the very general structural features of the world—
dynamical laws and the like. By contrast, there isn’t even a prima facie reason to think that
the hypothesis of mathematical entities receives further support from the detailed aspects
of our evidence that help us narrow down the location of the actual world within the space
of possibilities left open by such a theory.
tablished deductively, we can ignore these arguments. The most promising
remaining argument that I know of is one that parallels Kripke’s influen-
tial argument, in the appendix to Naming and Necessity (1972: pp. 156–58),
for the claim that if there are no unicorns, it is metaphysically impossible
for there to be unicorns. But Kripke’s argument is not all that strong. It
is not clear why a failed attempt to introduce a word as a natural kind
term should, in effect, confer on it an empty intension rather than a more
‘superficial’ fallback intension, like that of ‘horse-shaped animal with one
horn on its forehead’. Similarly, one might think that if there are in fact
no objects playing the characteristic ‘structural role’ of the numbers, ‘num-
ber’ would come to have the same (non-trivial) intension as ‘entity playing
such-and-such characteristic structural role’. The necessity thesis would
be a weak reed upon which to rest a case against nominalism.
Even if we did accept the necessity thesis as a priori, we might hope
to find a nominalistic reading of T♦ by reading ‘possibly’ as expressing
something weaker than metaphysical possibility. For example, we might
invoke a notion of conceptual possibility, cognate to the notion of ‘de-
ductive entailment’ to which we have been helping ourselves. A worry
about this approach concerns the status of ‘theoretical definitions’ of mixed
mathematico-physical predicates (like ‘is the ratio of the lengths of’) in
terms of purely physical predicates (like ‘equal in length’) and narrowly
mathematical ones (like ‘is a member of’). For example:
(*) r is the ratio of the length of a to that of b iff
for all functions f from physical line-segments to non-negative
real numbers such that f (x) = f (y) whenever x and y are equal in
length, and f (x) = f (y) + f (z) whenever x consists of two disjoint
parts one of which is equal in length to y and the other of which
is equal in length to z,
f (a)/ f (b) = r.17
While it is quite plausible that (*) or something like it is metaphysically
necessary, it is not so clear that there is any conceptual necessity in the
17This is similar to the definition of ‘The distance from x to y is r’ endorsed by Putnam
(1972: p. 340).
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vicinity; and it would be even less clear if we were dealing with some
less familiar notions than that of length, like charge-density or the metric
tensor. If these theoretical definitions are not conceptually necessary, and
the original theory T makes no explicit use of ‘purely physical’ predicates
like ‘equal in length’, then it will be much too easy for T♦ to be true taken
as a claim about conceptual possibility: the facts entirely about the con-
crete realm place no conceptual constraint on the extensions of the mixed
predicates, which are all that matters to the truth of T.
This problem does not arise when T is a rich theory which already
contains some explicit theoretical definition like (*) for each of its mixed
mathematico-physical predicates. One response to the worry, then, is sim-
ply to restrict the application of the method to such rich theories. I doubt
that this limitation will be much help to the anti-nominalist. Even though
standard scientific theories are not rich, this lack of specificity brings no
evident explanatory benefits. Sometimes, it is true, a less specific theory
is explanatorily better than all of its strengthenings—for example, a theory
describing some deterministic dynamical laws may only be made worse
by adding further specific information about initial conditions. But merely
leaving it open how one’s mixed predicates relate to purely physical and
narrowly mathematical ones doesn’t seem to achieve this kind of explana-
torily beneficial generality. Thus it is hard to see how we would lose
anything important if the menu of options to which we apply IBE were
restricted to rich theories.
A different response to the worry is to look for some modality intermedi-
ate between conceptual and metaphysical, on which theoretical definitions
like (*) are necessary even though the non-existence of mathematical enti-
ties is not, and use this in interpreting T♦ and T. This doesn’t seem all that
difficult. For intuitively, even if (*) and the non-existence of mathematical
entities are both metaphysically necessary, the source or explanation of their
necessity is different. If we can make sense of this thought, we can use it to
pick out a deductively closed class of propositions that includes metaphys-
ical necessities like (*) but does not include the proposition that there are
no mathematical entities, even if it is metaphysically necessary. We could
then use this class of propositions in specifying an interpretation of T♦ on
which it is neither too weak nor too strong to be useful to the nominalist.18
Suppose, finally, that we both accept the necessity thesis as a priori
and reject modalities more fine-grained than metaphysical necessity and
possibility. In that case T♦ is no use as it stands. But we may still be able to
modify it so as to achieve the desired effects.
One strategy for doing this is to substitute some nominalistically unprob-
lematic predicates for the problematic ones (those whose meaning allows
them to apply only to mathematical entities, in some of their argument
places). The idea is to begin by replacing T with an isomorphic theory T∗,
in which all the work that was done in T by problematic predicates is done
by unproblematic ones, such as predicates applicable to ghosts, or angels,
or inscriptions.19 If T said that for all x and y there is a set that has just x
and y as members, T∗ can say that for all x and y there is a ghost that loves
just x and y. If T said that for any two line segments there is a unique real
number that is the ratio of their lengths, T∗ can say that for any two line
segments there is a unique ghost that haunts them in some distinctive way.
Strictly speaking, this T∗ is already a nominalistic theory, albeit an implau-
sible one, since it entails that there are infinitely many ghosts (or whatever
other surrogates we chose). But if we then embed T∗ in some appropriately
restricted possibility operator, claiming merely that it is consistent with the
facts entirely about the entities we really care about, the result will be much
weaker, and more likely to be useful to the nominalist.20
Another strategy avoids the arbitrary choice of substitute predicates by
using higher-order quantification to Ramsify all the problematic predicates
18Some theorists have given formal theories of fine-grained concepts that can distinguish
different sources of metaphysical necessity. For example, Kit Fine uses an operator ‘It is true
in virtue of the nature of X that. . . ’, where X is a plural term. Metaphysical necessity is truth
in virtue of everything; when X are some but not all of the things there are, ‘It is true in virtue
of the nature of X that. . . ’ is a necessity operator stronger than metaphysical necessity.
While Fine’s conception of the entities in virtue of whose nature typical metaphysical
necessities hold is far from being acceptable to a nominalist, the general picture of a rich
space of intelligible weakenings of metaphysical possibility is one that nominalists might
embrace.
19Cf. Chihara 1990.
20Only on a rather expansive conception of our a priori access to facts about metaphysical
possibility will it be plausible that T deductively entails the possibility of T∗. Otherwise,
employing this strategy will mean giving up on desideratum (i).
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out of T. Let the problematic predicates be F1, . . . ,Fn; let T(X1, . . . ,Xn) be the
result of substituting appropriate higher-order variables X1. . . Xn for these
predicates; and let T∃ be ∃X1 . . .∃XnT(X1, . . . ,Xn). We can then, if we wish,
apply our restricted possibility operator to T∃ instead of T. Provided they
can understand the higher-order existential quantifications in T∃ in such a
way that they do not deductively entail that there are mathematical entities,
even those who accept the necessity thesis can take the resulting theory to
be nominalistic. Given our assumption that the existence of mathematical
entities is not a priori, it suffices to understand the second-order notation in
such a way that the theorems of standard systems of second-order logic—
like ∃X∀y(Xy)—are in fact deductively valid. Some will be happy to grant
that we can directly learn to understand the second-order notation in such
a way as to render standard logic is deductively valid (cf. Williamson 2003);
others will hold out for a translation of the notation into ordinary English
(see Lewis 1991, Rayo and Yablo 2001).
If we can understand second-order quantification in one of these ways,
T∃ is already a nominalistic theory. Is there any point in embedding it
further within a restricted possibility operator? Yes, if T included some
strong mathematical theory like ZFCU; for then T∃ will entail the existence
of a huge infinite number of entities of unspecified sort, whereas the claim
that T∃ is consistent with the truth about the concrete world plausibly
won’t.21 On the other hand, if T already entails the existence of a fairly
large infinity of concrete entities such as spacetime points, we may be able,
with some ingenuity, to weaken the required mathematical commitments
so much that the concrete entities themselves suffice to witness the truth of
T∃; in that case, we will achieve no further weakening by introducing the
possibility operator.22
21However, if—as Williamson (2002) maintains—the right logic for all modal operators is
a ‘constant-domain’ logic on which claims about how many things there are are necessary if
true, nothing is gained by embedding T∃ within a possibility operator. If constant-domain
modal logic is correct, the modal strategies with which this paper is concerned are less
interesting than they might otherwise seem, since they are of no use for avoiding IBE-style
arguments for strong claims about the cardinality of the universe.
22There is a version of mathematical structuralism that takes something like T∃ to specify
the ‘real’ content conveyed by an utterance whose face-value content is given by T. Whether
or not this is true as a hermeneutic claim, we should be interested in comparing the
Like the strategy that invokes conceptual possibility, the strategy using
surrogates and the strategy using higher-order quantification only work
when T is a ‘rich’ theory—one that contains theoretical definitions like
(*) that relate all its mixed mathematico-physical vocabulary to purely
concrete and narrowly mathematical vocabulary. Otherwise, too much of
the content of T will be lost in the transition to T∗ or T∃—in the worst case,
these theories will say nothing about any aspect of the concrete realm other
than its cardinality.
3 The adequacy of T
This time I will consider the three desiderata in reverse order.
(iii) Given our assumption that some theories do not deductively entail
that there are mathematical entities, I see no reason to doubt that T is
among them. Even if the necessity thesis were true, the result would be
that T is (vacuously) deductively entailed by the non-existence of mathe-
matical entities. This would indeed make it useless to the nominalist, but
the problem would involve desideratum (ii), not (iii).
(ii) Like T♦, T will certainly fail to be empirically equivalent to T if T
does not deductively entail, for each E that is part of our evidence, that E
is entirely about the concrete. Otherwise, we can at best have empirical
equivalence modulo an auxiliary hypothesis that does deductively entail
these claims. But even if these claims are all a priori, it is still not obvious
that T deductively entails E whenever T does. The problem comes from
the formal possibility that T is vacuously true because no M-world is
concretely indiscernible from the actual world—in other words, that the
actual world is in Region 1 of Figure 1. If this cannot be ruled out a priori,
Twill not, taken on its own, satisfy desideratum (ii): the fact that E follows
from T is no reason to think that E holds throughout Region 1. We will
need to package T together with an auxiliary hypothesis that rules out the
possibility in question:
explanatory strength of the existentially quantified theory with a stronger theory that
purports to talk about a distinctive realm of mathematical objects structured by some sui
generis natural relations. The discussion of the explanatory goodness of section 4 does
apply, mutatis mutandis, to T∃.
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(M♦) Possibly, the concrete realm is just as it in fact is, and M.
It is evident that T and M♦ together entail T♦, and thus entail every
proposition entirely about the concrete realm that T entails.23
Is M♦ a priori? If we are not moved by the considerations that support
the necessity thesis, and take an optimistic view of the scope of deductive
rationality, there is some appeal to the idea that it is. If one is less optimistic
than this about the extent of our a priori knowledge about metaphysical
possibility, there are some possible strategies for avoiding the need to rely
on M♦, corresponding to those we considered in discussing the necessity
thesis in section 2. One is to replace the metaphysical necessity in T with
some stronger notion of necessity, so that we only need a counterpart of
M♦ using a correspondingly weaker notion of possibility. Another is to
eliminate specifically mathematical vocabulary, either by using surrogates
like ghosts, or by using higher-order quantification to formulate a theory
like T∀:
(T∀) Necessarily, if the concrete realm is just as it in fact is, then
∀X1 . . .∀Xn (if M(X1, . . . ,Xn) then T(X1, . . . ,Xn)).24
Assuming T is ‘rich’ in the sense of the previous section, to get something
empirically equivalent to T, we will only need to combine T∀ with M♦∃:
(M♦∃) Possibly, the concrete realm is just as it in fact is, and
∃X1 . . .∃XnM(X1, . . . ,Xn).
The case for the apriority of claims like M♦∃, which essentially say nothing
more than that the concrete realm’s being just as it in fact is is consistent with
23M♦ is somewhat similar to the claim that M is ‘conservative’ in the sense of Field
1980: that is, such that the result of combining it with any consistent theory entirely
about the concrete realm is itself consistent. The differences are that (a) Field’s notion of
consistency is that of narrowly logical consistency, whereas M♦ uses something closer to
metaphysical possibility; (b) Field’s notion quantifies only over recursively axiomatisable
theories about the concrete realm, whereas M♦ requires consistency with the complete truth
about the concrete realm, even if it is not recursively axiomatisable; and (c) for the parallel
to go through, one would need either to add a ‘Necessarily’ in front of M♦, or to change
the definition of ‘conservative’ to require consistency with true theories entirely about the
concrete rather than consistent theories.
24Hellman’s reconstructive project (Hellman 1989) involves replacing each T with some-
thing like T∀.
the universe as a whole having an appropriately large infinite cardinality, is
relatively strong. However, even this requires a fairly expansive conception
of the scope of deductive rationality: the justification even of claims of
narrowly logical possibility, let alone claims of metaphysical possibility, is
certainly much more mysterious and problematic than the justification of
elementary logical theorems. If we take a narrower view of the a priori,
then there will be no way to avoid having to include something like M♦
(or M♦∃) along with T (or T∀) as part of the package which we assess for
explanatory goodness. Section 7 below will consider whether this makes a
significant difference.
(i) There is no narrowly logical reason to think that T must deductively
entail T. This is clear from Figure 1: prima facie, the actual world could be
one of the T-worlds in Region 3—a T-world that is concretely indiscernible
from some M-world that is not a T-world. If we can rule this out a priori, it
must be because M plays a distinctive role within T: M must, in conjunction
with the claim that T is consistent with the truth about the concrete realm
(T♦), deductively entail T.
I think it is quite plausible that this is so, in the case of standard mathemat-
ical theories and typical scientific theories that rely on them. How could
an M-world w′ fail to be a T-world while being concretely indiscernible
from a T-world w? I see four possibilities. The first is that the truth of T at
w depends on the obtaining there of some fundamental relations between
concrete and mathematical entities—relations which do not supervene on
the totality of facts either about the concrete realm or about the narrowly
mathematical relations with which M is concerned (like set-membership).25
Perhaps some of the mixed mathematico-physical predicates of T, like ‘r is
the ratio of the length of x to that of y’, stand for these non-supervenient
mixed relations.26 If T admits of such ‘heavy duty platonist’ interpreta-
tions, it does not deductively entail T: the fact that w′ is an M-world that
is concretely indiscernible from a T-world does not ensure that the non-
supervenient mixed relations behave in such a way as to make T true at w′.
25Cf. the view Field (1984: §5) calls ‘heavy duty platonism’.
26If so, ‘theoretical definitions’ like (*) are either contingent, or necessarily true but only
because facts about which things are equally long are themselves not entirely about the
concrete realm.
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However, I doubt we would lose any explanatorily important generality if
we confined our attention to theories T that explicitly state, for each of their
mixed mathematico-physical predicates, that its extension supervenes on
facts about the concrete realm and narrowly mathematical relations.27
A second possibility is that the truth of T at w but not w′ depends on
some facts entirely about the mathematical realm that do not follow from
M, and obtain at w but not w′. Perhaps, for example, some large cardinal
axiom is true at w but not at w′, and this, together with the facts about the
concrete realm, prevents T from being true there. But ordinary theories in
the sciences don’t work like this: they simply help themselves to as much
mathematics as they need.
The third possibility is that the relevant difference between w and w′
involves some impure mathematical claims which need to be true for T to
be true. For example, perhaps at w there is a bijection between the set
of spacetime points and the set of real numbers, while at the concretely
indiscernible w′ there is no such bijection. This sort of thing will happen
all the time if M as a first-order theory, say first-order ZFCU. For given
any infinite set U, there are many different ways to extend U to a model
of first-order ZFCU where U serves as the interpretation of ‘urelement’;
different set-theoretic claims about the cardinality of the set of urelements
are true in these different models. If these models correspond to differ-
ent possible worlds in the obvious way, then the facts entirely about the
concrete world and the truth of first-order ZFCU do not settle which pure
sets stand in one-one correspondence with the set of concrete objects. But
this is one of the places where we seem to manifest an understanding of
questions of cardinality that transcends first-order logic. Even if there are
infinitely many concrete objects, we can make sense of different hypotheses
about how many of them there are without bringing in numbers at all. For
example, we can make sense of the hypothesis that there are at most ℵ1
concrete objects.28 Among worlds where first-order ZFCU is true, we can
27A theory T could satisfy this condition either by containing a necessitated version of
a (*)-style theoretical definition for each of its mixed predicates, or by merely making the
supervenience claim while leaving it open exactly how the supervenience works.
28As follows: whenever there are infinitely many of the xs and infinitely many of the
ys, and all of the xs and ys are concrete, either there are as many xs as concrete objects, or
distinguish the ‘well-behaved’ ones, where the set-theoretic characterisa-
tion of the set of concreta corresponds to the intrinsic fact of the matter
about how many concreta there are, from the rest. This suggests that we
can legitimately take M to be a second-order (or plural) version of ZFCU, in
which case we don’t have to worry about this kind of difference between w
and w′. For according to a theorem of Zermelo (1930), second-order ZFC is
‘quasi-categorical’: for any two of its models, one is isomorphic to an initial
segment of the set-theoretic hierarchy of the other. The result extends to
models of second-order ZFCU, provided that the sets that interpret ‘urele-
ment’ are themselves isomorphic. This can plausibly be taken to show that
two possible worlds at both of which the second-order or plural version
of ZFCU is true, and where exactly the same urelements exist, can differ
set-theoretically only as regards the height of the hierarchy.
The fourth possibility is that the relevant difference between w and w′
involves some facts about abstract entities other than mathematical ones,
which matter to the truth of T. For example, maybe w′ contains abstract
angels, and T entails that there are none.29 If this is an issue, it is easily dealt
with by expanding M slightly—in most cases, it should suffice to include
the claim that the only abstract entities are mathematical ones.
4 The damning analogy
Let’s suppose that T♦ and T both meet desiderata (i)–(iii): they are de-
ductively entailed by T, empirically equivalent to it, and nominalistic. If
so, everything turns on desideratum (iv): the anti-nominalist needs an ar-
gument that T♦ and T are worse—less plausible as stopping-places for
explanation—than T, for some good theory T.
How could one go about arguing for a conclusion like that? An attrac-
tive idea is that we should look at the way scientists actually reason. It is
scientists, not philosophers, who are most noted for their skill in inductive
reasoning. If we want to determine what the best kind of inductive reason-
there are are as many ys as concrete objects, or there are as many xs as ys.
29Do ordinary scientific theories ever entail such things? Anna Mahtani pointed out
to me that they may do so implicitly, by making claims about causal or counterfactual
relations among concreta that would not obtain in certain kinds of angel-worlds.
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ing requires in a given case, we should not just sit around thinking about
how we are disposed to reason; instead, we should be guided by examples
of good inductive reasoning in scientific practice.
There are more and less direct ways to apply this ‘naturalistic’ method-
ology in assessing the epistemic credentials of nominalistic replacements
for standard scientific theories. The direct approach is to listen to what
actual scientists say when we present them with the particular theories we
are interested in. The indirect approach is to see how scientists reason in
other domains, extract some general epistemological principles about what
makes for theoretical goodness and badness, and apply these principles to
the questions we are interested in.
Burgess and Rosen (1997: §III.C.1.a) have recently championed the direct
approach. They wryly suggest that nominalistic alternatives to standard
scientific theories should be tested by submitting them to scientific journals
like the Physical Review. If they are rejected, we are invited to conclude that
the theories in question are worse, epistemically speaking, than the origi-
nals, so that the original theories’ claim on our credence remains undiluted.
There are several reasons to be uneasy with such a naked appeal to
authority. Let me mention three. First, the standards for acceptance in
a given scientific journal are evidently quite far from the notion of the-
oretical goodness we are interested in: for one thing, they reflect facts
about the currently accepted demarcation between the different branches
of science. Biologists obviously shouldn’t be worried by the fact that their
papers would be rejected by Physical Review; why should it be different for
nominalistic philosophers? The central professional judgment that would
lie behind the rejection from Physical Review is ‘this belongs in a philosophy
journal’. This obviously has nothing to do with theoretical goodness, and
everything to do with the demarcation of different subject areas within the
overall scientific enterprise. Since the question of nominalism happens
not fall into the remit of any of the currently constituted departments of
the science faculty, any scientists we might ask about it would be going
beyond their sphere of distinctively professional expertise. The situation
is the same with many debates in the philosophy of physics. Philosophers
who aspire to learn from physicists soon realise that most physicists just
don’t care about the theoretical differences that seem so important to us.
Unless the lesson we think we should learn from the physicists that we
shouldn’t care either, our learning is going to have to be indirect, guided
by analogies between our questions and the ones in which physicists do
have a professional interest.
Second, even if deference to scientists shows that we have good reason
to believe in numbers, it is not clear how this bears on our limited question,
which is whether we have good reason of an inductive, topic-neutral sort to
believe in numbers. The way scientists actually reason about mathematical
entities seems strikingly different from the way they reason about electrons
and such like. One natural moral for ‘naturalists’ to draw from this is that
good reasoning about numbers is subject to topic-specific standards very
different from those that govern inductive reasoning about other kinds of
theoretical posits.30
Third, even if I were to concede that ‘there are numbers’ is true in ordinary
scientific English, in the context of ordinary scientific discourse, there is a
further question which I think I understand, and which this concession
would leave open—whether there are numbers in the most fundamental
sense.31 If there is a distinct intelligible question here, no amount of direct
deference to scientists will help us resolve it. Nevertheless, if there is
such a question, it is especially plausible that it cannot be resolved by
deductive or perceptual or topic-specific considerations, so it is important
to investigate what good inductive reasoning might have to say about it.
Even if scientists almost never use the fundamental quantifiers themselves,
scientific considerations do give us reason to form opinions about what
there is in the most fundamental sense. For example, I think we have
some reason to think that among the things that there are, fundamentally
speaking, are spacetime points or regions. The epistemic situation might
be similar for numbers or sets. But if we want to see whether it is, we will
get nowhere by trying to cajole scientists into making pronouncements on
the question.
For these reasons, I think the indirect version of the naturalistic method-
ology is more promising for our purposes. What we want, essentially, is an
30Maddy (1997) draws the latter conclusion.
31See Dorr 2007: §1 for an introduction to the question as I understand it, and Dorr 2005
for a more concerted attempt to explain it to those who don’t.
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argument by analogy, of the form ‘Given scientific practice, the following
must be explanatorily bad theories; the theory we are interested in is similar
in relevant respects to them; therefore the theory we are interested in is also
a bad theory’. In the case of T♦, a rather powerful argument of this form
is implicit in much of the literature on ‘the indispensability argument’, for
example in Putnam’s discussion of ‘fictionalism’ (1972: pp. 350–56); Field
(1988: pp. 260–61) articulates it especially clearly. I will state the argument
in my own way.
Scientists—at least when they are reasoning unselfconsciously and not
being led astray by bad philosophy—believe that there are lots of things
much too small to be observed by anyone. So we should conclude that this
belief is required by good inductive reasoning. This is so despite the fact—
much dwelt on by scientific anti-realists like van Fraassen (1980), who deny
that we ought to believe in unobservable entities—that for any theory T
postulating unobservable entities, we can easily find a theory which shares
T’s consequences about the observable realm without entailing anything
about unobservables. One such theory is
(T) Possibly, all observable matters are just as they in fact are, and T.
T says that T is ‘observationally adequate’: those of its consequences that
are entirely about observable matters are true. Since our evidence gives us
good inductive reason to believe claims about unobservable matters that
do not follow from any theory of the form of T, these must be bad theories.
Of course, we have reason to believe many such theories: T is after all
deductively entailed by T. But this reason derives from the reason we have
to believe stronger theories which do have nontrivial consequences about
the unobservable world.
What is it about these theories that makes them so bad? One factor that
seems closely related to explanatory goodness is simplicity. Could it be the
sheer complexity of the notion of ‘observability’ (and its precisifications)
that is responsible for the badness of T (and its precisifications)? No. For
even when we replace the notion of observability with something precise
and reasonably simple, we still end up with theories which must be bad:
Possibly, the position of the centre of mass of each atom is just as
it in fact is, and T.
Possibly, the total mass contained in each region of space at each
time is just what it in fact is, and T.
Since we do, or at least could, have empirical reason to believe some rea-
sonably specific claims about subatomic structure, and about fields other
than the mass-density field, these theories must be bad in the same way as
T. In the light of such examples, it is natural to conclude that the badness-
making feature all these theories share is their distinctive logical structure.
But this structure is also shared by T♦. So we can conclude that T♦ is also a
bad theory.
For this argument to be defensible, we need to be careful about the
meaning of ‘bad’. One thing it certainly cannot mean is ‘a priori unlikely’:
since T is a logical consequence of T, it must be at least as a priori likely as
T. What is a priori unlikely is not that T should be true, but that it should
be true without its truth being entailed or probabilified by the truth of some
better theory—T itself, or some other theory that entails quite a lot about
the unobservable portions of the world. This suggests the following gloss
on ‘bad’: a theory is bad just to the extent that it is a priori unlikely that
it should be true without its truth being explained by that of any better theory.
While this is no good as a definition, given its circularity, it does suffice to
ground useful entailments between claims about theoretical goodness and
claims about a priori likelihood.32
32This notion of theoretical badness should not be confused with the related notion of
crying out for explanation. Roughly, for a claim to cry out for explanation is for it to be
unlikely conditional on its being true that its truth is not explained by that of any better
theory. Not all bad theories cry out for explanation. Even if it is very unlikely that T is
true and unexplained, it might be similarly unlikely that T is true and explained, in which
case the probability that T is explained conditional on its being true will not be high. It is
not plausible that the extent to which a theory cries out for explanation is determined by
facts about its logico-syntactic structure. White (2007) considers theories that are enormous
conjunctions of claims about the position and size of each pebble on a certain beach. Even
though these theories are all syntactically very similar, some—such as those that describe
arrangements in which the pebbles compose pictures of faces—cry out for explanation far
more urgently than others. That’s because there is a fairly good theory—that the pebbles
were deliberately arranged by someone aiming to make a picture of a face—which raises
the probability of the conjunctions that describe face-like arrangements, while there is no
comparably good theory which significantly raises the probability of the conjunctions that
describe random-looking jumbles.
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The argument that since T and T♦ are similar in logical form, they must
also be similar in being bad theories may seem too tenuous to carry so much
weight. T and T♦ are dissimilar in lots of ways. For example, the objects
‘modalised away’ by T♦ are abstract (non-spatiotemporal, causally ineffi-
cacious,. . . ), whereas those ‘modalised away’ by T are concrete. Why rest
so much on the similarities? But then again, what can we go on, besides
such analogies, in coming up with an evaluation of T♦? We have several
millenia’s worth of experience to show us that, once we start appealing
directly to our distinctively philosophical intuitions—intuitions concerning
the alleged difficulty of knowing anything about causally inefficacious
objects, for example—the debate about the epistemological status of nom-
inalism will end up hopelessly deadlocked. There is something deeply
appealing about the ‘naturalistic’ methodology that tells us to form opin-
ions about controversial questions in applied epistemology, such as that of
the epistemic status of T♦, by starting with the large body of case-by-case
epistemological judgements common to all scientific realists, looking for
whichever epistemological theory does the best job of accounting for and
systematising this data, and following this theory where it leads.
5 Extending the analogy to T?
We certainly could extract from examples like T some general principle
that would impugn T as well as T♦. For example, we could conclude
that the use of modal operators, or at least their use in stating theories
about subject matters that don’t themselves have any special connection to
modality, is a general source of theoretical badness. Or we could conclude
that ‘parasitic’ theories, which embed other, stronger, theories, are ipso
facto bad. There is something compelling about such conclusions: they
resonate with our moral judgment that theft is bad, and honest toil is better.
But we should not mistake a resonant metaphor for a good argument.
Is it actually true that modality and/or parasitism are general sources of
theoretical badness? If it is, T-style theories are tarred with the same brush
as T♦-style theories, and we are thrown back upon Field’s programme. And
who knows whether we will be able to come up with nominalistic versions
of general relativity or quantum mechanics that are as utterly free of any
taint of similarity to theories like T as is Field’s version of Newtonian
gravitation? If not, the question of the explanatory goodness of T-style
theories remains unresolved.
Can we construct an analogy that does for T what the analogy with T
did for T♦? To do so, we would have to find some theory of the form
(T) Necessarily, if the observable facts are just as they in fact are and
BLAH, then T
which is empirically equivalent to T. But what could BLAH be? For T
to be observationally equivalent to T, it needs to be filled in in such a way
that (i) every BLAH-world that is observationally indiscernible from a T-
world is itself a T-world, and (ii) every world (or anyway, every world that
is not observationally indiscernible from any T-world) is observationally
indiscernible from some BLAH-world.
One proposition with these properties is the material conditional T ⊃ T:
(T⊃) Necessarily, if the observable facts are just as they in fact are and
(T ⊃ T), then T.
T⊃ is a priori equivalent to T: it is true at w if the observable facts at w are
consistent with T, and false at w if the observable facts at w are inconsistent
with T. So we have the same reason to think that T⊃ is a bad theory that we
have for T. However, the structural parallel between T⊃ and T is much
weaker than that between T and T♦—too weak for the analogy to carry
any force. The mathematical theory M that features in T is a simple piece
of theory—much simpler than T itself, of which it is a conjunct—whereas
T ⊃ T is at least as complex as T. Moreover, T⊃ embeds T, which we
already have reason to think of as a distinctively bad theory, whereas T
does not embed anything that we have independent reason to regard as
problematic.
To get a serious argument by analogy going, we would need to find some
simple, unified claim to substitute for BLAH in T—something that we could
think of as exhausting the ‘non-observational content’ of T in the same way
M exhausts its mathematical content. But ordinary scientific theories about
unobservables don’t contain anything like this; nor do ordinary scientific
theories about subatomic particles, electric charges, and so on. If some
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empirically successful theory T did turn out to have a fragment which
determined all the facts about subatomic particles as a function of facts
about the locations of atoms, while being consistent with any consistent
hypothesis about the locations of atoms, then this fragment could play the
role of BLAH. But in the cases where we clearly have reason to believe in
some unobservable structure, we don’t have reason to believe in any simple
formula whereby the facts about that structure can be read off from other
facts. Once such ‘reading off’ comes into view, our belief in the hidden
structure wavers. An example is the gravitational field in Newtonian
gravitational theory. Some rather elegant versions of the theory take the
gravitational field (or the gravitational potential) to be a genuine piece
of extra intrinsic structure, in virtue of which geometrically indiscernible
regions of empty space could fail to be duplicates, but governed by laws
which fully determine the field at any time given the distribution of mass
at that time.33 But even if such a theory perfectly fit our evidence, there
would be little pressure to believe in the gravitational field as a piece of
additional intrinsic structure. Given that the theory has a simple fragment
which lets us read off the facts about the field from distribution of masses,
the proposed structure seems redundant. A view that use the fragment
to define the gravitational field extrinsically, in terms of the distribution of
masses, is an attractive alternative to the view that takes it to be intrinsic
and fundamental.34
The prospects for establishing the badness of T using an argument
parallel to our argument by analogy for the badness of T♦ seem poor. But
wait: do we need a new argument at all? Section 3 held out the hope
that T and T♦ are a priori equivalent, in the central cases of interest. If
they are equivalent, doesn’t that mean that they are really the same theory,
or at least, that they are alike in respect of theoretical goodness? —No,
it had better not mean that. If we individuated theories coarsely, so that
logical equivalence was sufficient for identity, the the argument from the
33Interestingly, Field’s way of nominalising Newtonian gravity depends essentially on
taking this realist attitude to the gravitational field.
34In electromagnetism, by contrast, the possibility of source-free radiation prevents any
analogous ‘reading off’ of the facts about the electromagnetic field from the distribution of
charged matter.
similarity of logical form between T and T♦ to their similarity in respect
of theoretical virtue would be a non-starter. For on this way of thinking
of theories, a theory has many different logical forms. The mere fact that
two theories can be given analogous logical forms tells us little, since it
is compatible with there being some other logical form that only one of
the theories admits. In particular, if T♦ admits a ‘T-style’ logical form
in addition to its ‘T♦-style’ logical form, while T admits no relevantly
similar logical form, that might well be an epistemically relevant difference
between T♦ and T. Indeed, on this way of talking, every theory admits
a ‘T♦-style’ logical form—if T is entirely about subject matter S, then T is
a priori equivalent to ‘Possibly, the S-facts are just as they in fact are, and
T’. If one is going to try to characterise good inductive reasoning using an
IBE-style framework, a fine-grained conception of theories, as something
like structured propositions, is more useful for the purposes of formulating
generalisations about theoretical goodness.
6 Existential and universal quantification
So far, then, the only arguments on the table for the badness of theories like
T involve deriving some very sweeping general principle, like ‘Parasitic
theories are bad’, from examples like T. This already looks tendentious.
The current section will introduce some new data which will cast further
doubt on these arguments, by suggesting that the contrast between parasitic
theories which use possibility operators (like T♦) and those which use
necessity operators (like T) may matter a lot to the theories’ epistemic
status. The data will involve the related contrast between existential and
universal quantification.
If science can tell us anything at all about the unobservable world, one
thing it tells us is that objects that are alike in respect of shape, size, motion
and mass need not be exactly alike in all respects. For example, objects that
are exactly alike in all those respects can fail to be perfect duplicates by
having different distributions of electric charge. We have—or at least could
have—good empirical reason to believe this, in spite of the following fact:
for any theory T that entails that things sometimes differ intrinsically by
having different charge distributions, we can find a weaker theory that has
14
all the same consequences as T concerning the shapes, sizes, motions and
masses of material bodies, while being consistent with the thesis that these
are the only intrinsic respects in which things ever differ. One such theory
uses a possibility operator: ‘Possibly, the facts about shape, size, motion
and mass are just as they in fact are, and T’. But when T contains enough
mathematics, there is no need to use a modal operator to formulate the
desired weakening: ordinary quantification is enough. We can proceed as
follows: (i) Express T in such a way that all talk of charge is accomplished
by a single expression—say a one-place functor ‘charge(x)’. (ii) Replace
each occurrence of ‘charge(x) = n’ with ‘c(x) = n’, where c is some new
variable ranging over functions from bodies to real numbers; call the result
of this T(c). (iii) Let our new theory T∃c be ∃cT(c). Since the availability of
theories like T∃c does not undermine our inductive reason to believe that
charge is just as real and intrinsic as shape, size, motion and mass, we can
conclude that T∃c must be a much worse theory than T.
Although T∃c does not explicitly mention electrical charge, there are
ways to interpret ‘charge’ on which it entails that ‘objects have charges’ is
true. We could, for example, interpret ‘charge(x) = n’ as meaning ‘for some
function c such that T(c), c(x) = n’ or ‘for the unique function c such that T(c),
c(x) = n’. Or, if we wanted ‘If objects have charges, then T(charge)’ to come
out expressing a contingent truth, we could get a bit fancier, interpreting
‘n is the charge of x’ to mean something like ‘c(n) = x for the function c
that plays the simplest sufficiently “charge-like” role in relation to the facts
about shape, size, motion, and mass.’35 On these interpretations of ‘charge’,
the proposition expressed by ‘T(charge)’ may even be a priori equivalent
to T∃c. But these propositions are very different from the original theory
T, as we were imagining it. On the intended interpretation, the facts about
charge were supposed to be intrinsic, at least in the sense that objects with
different distributions of charge are never duplicates. By contrast, any
interpretation of T on which it follows from T∃c will require ‘charge’ to
express something highly extrinsic.
We might think of extending the ‘charitable interpretation’ trick to predi-
cates like ‘duplicate’ as well as predicates like ‘charge’; then T∃c would after
35In working out such an interpretation, we might take inspiration from ‘best system’
analyses of lawhood (Lewis 1994).
all entail that ‘objects with different charge distributions are never dupli-
cates’ is true. But this way lies Putnam’s paradox (Lewis 1984). There must
be more to correctness of interpretation than considerations of charity! Oth-
erwise any theory we ended up accepting would be correctly interpreted
as equivalent to the result of ‘existentially quantifying out’ all of its non-
logical constants; the only way such a theory could be false would be for it
to make some false claim about the cardinality of the universe. Predicates
like ‘duplicate’ seem an especially good place to put a stop to charity run
amok. While it is debatable whether T∃c is a priori consistent with the hy-
pothesis that nothing is charged, it is very clear that it is a priori consistent
with the hypothesis that objects are duplicates whenever they are alike in
respect of shape, size etc.
So T∃c really is weaker than the original T, and weaker than what the
empirical success of T would give us reason to believe; our conclusion
that it is a bad theory stands. There is a general pattern here. If we want
to weaken a theory so as to eliminate its commitment to some sort of
hidden structure, we can often do so by replacing the vocabulary which
purports to characterise this structure with variables of an appropriate sort,
bound by initial existential quantifiers. Philosophers who are suspicious
of particular putative bits of hidden structure keep on rediscovering this
fact, and announcing that they have shown how to eliminate the structure
in question. But once we have realised the complete generality of the trick,
we should not be impressed by their achievements. Here are some more
examples.
(i) Many ordinary physical theories that speak of fundamental parti-
cles are naturally understood as entailing that these particles come
in several qualitatively different kinds. But we can get rid of this
entailment, by replacing each predicate purporting to stand for a
kind of particle with a new plural variable, bound by an initial
existential quantifier. So our new theory will look something like
this: ‘there are some particles, the xs; and there are some parti-
cles, the ys, and. . . such that T(the xs, the ys,. . . )’. We can also
attempt to reinterpret the original theory so that it is entailed by
the new theory, by analysing the predicates the purport to stand
for kinds of particles as expressing extrinsic properties that par-
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ticles instantiate in virtue of their motions with respect to other
particles.
(ii) Ordinary physical theories formulated in co-ordinate terms are
naturally understood as claiming that spacetime has a geomet-
ric structure much richer than that of mere topology: regions of
spacetime can differ in all sorts of intrinsic geometric respects
even when they are topologically indiscernible. But any such
theory can be weakened so as to remove this implication: we
need only say that there is some co-ordinate system which respects
the spacetime’s topological structure, relative to which the given
dynamical equations are true. This minimalistic way of thinking
about the content of such theories is favoured by van Fraassen
(1970). And, under the influence of a positivist philosophy that
rejects the whole idea of intrinsic structure, similar ideas are still
sometimes found in physics textbooks—it is common to formulate
Newton’s first law as the claim that ‘there exist inertial frames’,
where these end up getting defined as frames in which Newton’s
laws hold.36 But I have no interest in deferring to the opinions of
physicists when these are manifestly influenced by the discred-
ited anti-realist philosophies of the past. We do have good reason
to ascribe to spacetime an intrinsic geometric structure that goes
far beyond topology. Thus the existentially quantified theories
which purport to explain all our observations without entailing
that there is any such structure must be bad theories.
(iii) Similarly, Newtonian mechanics, by speaking about absolute ac-
celerations, seems to require reality to have a geometric struc-
ture that fails to supervene on the history of distances between
pairs of particles. This is generally agreed to be a major prob-
lem for Leibnizian relationalism, according to which there is no
more to geometric structure than the history of these distances.
But according to Huggett (2006), there is no problem. The Leib-
nizian relationalist can simply adopt a theory of the form ‘there
are some admissible co-ordinate systems in which Newton’s laws
36See, e.g., Woodhouse 2003.
hold’, where ‘admissible’ co-ordinate systems are those that re-
spect the history of inter-particle distances. Huggett goes on to
suggest a ‘best system’ analysis of claims about absolute acceler-
ation: roughly, to be accelerating is to be accelerating according
to every ‘best’ co-ordinate system, where ‘best’ is understood in
such a way that if there are any admissible co-ordinate systems in
which Newton’s laws hold, they are guaranteed to include all the
best ones.
(iv) Imagine a theory of fluid mechanics that describes a world en-
tirely filled with a continuous fluid, moving around in various
ways, and instantiating different fundamental scalar quantities
like mass-density and charge-density. To the extent that we had
reason to take such a theory seriously as a fundamental theory,
we would have reason to reject a stringent version of Humean
supervenience on which there is nothing more to the world than
points standing in spatiotemporal relations and instantiating in-
trinsic properties. But our fluid-mechanical theory can be weak-
ened to make it compatible with this stringent Humeanism, by
existentially Ramsifying the vocabulary that purports to charac-
terise the velocity field, or the partition of spacetime into tra-
jectories of matter-points. And provided that this existentially
quantified theory is true, we will be able to find extrinsic ‘best
system’ interpretations of expressions like ‘trajectory of a matter-
point’ or ‘velocity field vector’ under which the original theory is
true. Sider (2002) develops such analyses, and concludes that the
Humean has nothing to fear from the celebrated Leibniz-Russell-
Broad-Kripke-Armstrong spinning disc/spinning sphere/infinite
river objection. But he is wrong. If we are ever justified in positing
hidden structure, sufficient empirical successes by a fundamen-
tal fluid-mechanical theory would justify us in positing hidden
structure of a non-Humean sort.
(v) Once we have enough mathematics on board, we need not have
recourse to possibility operators, as in T, if we want to weaken
any theory so as to eliminate the implication that there are unob-
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servable objects: we can use existential quantification over models
to achieve the same effect. We need only define up some notion
of what it is for a model to ‘accurately represent the observable
facts’: then our new theory can simply say that the old theory
is true in some model that accurately represents the observable
facts.
The rule seems to be this: when we modify a theory by replacing an ex-
pression that purported to stand for some aspect of the intrinsic structure
of the world with a variable bound by an initial existential quantifier, the
result is generally much worse than the original theory, even when it is
empirically equivalent. The other important observation is that these bad
existentially quantified theories are closely akin to bad theories like T. In-
deed, the work done by existential quantifiers could in each case be done by
an appropriate possibility-operator. For example, the Leibnizian relation-
alist could offer a theory of the form ‘Possibly, the facts about the intrinsic
properties of particles and the inter-particle distances are just as they in
fact are, and T’, where T is some orthodox version of Newtonian mechan-
ics that entails the existence of rich geometric structure. We should thus
expect that the true explanation of the badness of T and T♦ involves some
feature which they share with the bad existentially quantified theories we
have just been considering. And there is no mystery about what that could
be. Even those who reject the ontology of possible worlds can recognise
the logical parallels between possibility operators and existential quanti-
fiers which form the basis for possible-worlds model theory. For example,
the inferences^(φ∨ψ) ` ^φ∨^ψ and ∃x(φ∨ψ) ` ∃xφ∨∃xψ are both valid,
while the inferences ^φ ∧ ^ψ ` ^(φ ∧ ψ) and ∃xφ ∧ ∃xψ ` ∃x(φ ∧ ψ) are
not. It would thus not be at all surprising if the true canons of theoretical
virtue turned out to group possibility operators and existential quantifiers
together, as distinctive sources of theoretical badness.
This is already enough to cast doubt on the claim that the badness of T is
due to some feature it shares with T, such as relying on a modal operator
or being parasitic. For our existentially-quantified theories use no modal
operators, and are not in the relevant sense parasitic.37
37Perhaps there is a historical sense in which the existentially quantified theories can be
If the canons of theoretical virtue are sensitive to the logical parallel
between possibility-operators and existential quantifiers, as they seem to
be, it stands to reason that they should also be sensitive to the logical
parallel between necessity operators and universal quantifiers. So we can
support the claim that there is an epistemologically important difference
between necessity operators and possibility operators by arguing for an
epistemologically important difference between universal and existential
quantification. And in fact, prima facie, there is such a difference. It is
utterly standard for a theory to consist of a universal quantification, or
a conjunction of universal quantifications. By contrast, my attempts to
imagine scientifically interesting theories that are conjunctions of existen-
tial quantifications all have something of the flavour of the bad theories
considered above. Consider for example a theory that says that there is
a point of space towards which all bodies accelerate (in certain specified
ways). It seems to me that if we found out that there was such a point,
we would have reason to think that it was intrinsically special, or at least
that it could be distinguished by some structural role simpler than that of
being a point towards which bodies accelerate in the specified ways. We
should thus not be satisfied with the existentially quantified theory as a
stopping place for explanations—we should hold out for some stronger
theory which gives a substantive characterisation of the attractive point.
So things seem to be going well for T. We could further bolster the case
for its theoretical goodness if we found some class of universally-quantified
theories that stand to T as the bad existentially-quantified theories con-
sidered above stand to T♦, and those theories turned out to be theoretically
good. What could these theories be like? The logical structure we are
looking for is fairly distinctive: just as it is only in special cases that one
said to be ‘parasitic’: the process whereby they in fact came to our attention involved our
first thinking of a strong, hidden-structure-positing theory, and then noticing that we could
weaken it by existentially quantifying out the structure-characterising predicates. But I
doubt that such merely historical features of theories should matter when we’re considering
ideal inductive reasoning, as opposed to heuristics and rules of thumb. Anyway, the history
of science is full of cases where a good theory was arrived at by weakening some worse,
stronger theory: for example, special relativity was derived in this way from Lorentzian
mechanics. The history of such episodes shows that a general suspicion of such theories is
not much good even as a heuristic.
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can weaken a theory by embedding it within a restricted necessity operator,
likewise it is only in special cases that one can weaken a theory by replac-
ing one of its primitive expressions with a variable bound by a restricted
universal quantifier.
It seems to me that ordinary physical theories stated in co-ordinate terms
fit the bill. When physicists write down equations about the rates of
change of physically interesting quantities with respect to the x, y, z and
t co-ordinates, they don’t mean to suggest that there is a distinguished,
intrinsically privileged co-ordinate system, concerning which we could
sensibly ask questions like ‘how far are we from the origin?’. Rather,
they are—sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly—making universally
quantified claims, to the effect that the equations in question hold true for
every co-ordinate system that is ‘admissible’, in the sense of fitting in the
right way with the intrinsic structure of the space in question.38 Invariably,
however, the claim that the equations hold for all admissible co-ordinate
systems is a consequence of the claim that they hold in any one admissible
co-ordinate system: if this were not true, we would know that we were
working with an unduly impoverished conception of the intrinsic struc-
ture of the space, and thus an unduly generous definition of ‘admissible’.
The universally quantified theory that physicists actually take seriously is
thus deductively entailed by the silly theory that posits a unique privileged
co-ordinate system. The transition from the latter to the former stands to
the transition from T to T as the transition from T to T∃c stands to the
transition from T to T♦.
I don’t suppose anyone has ever believed in the ‘one true x-axis’. But
actual physics does provide examples of transitions of the kind in question.
One is the transition from Newton’s version of Newtonian mechanics, with
38Standard theories in physics don’t normally answer the question what it is for a co-
ordinate system to be ‘admissible’: instead, they merely place constraints on the answer to
this question, by characterising a relation between co-ordinate systems such that all and only
those co-ordinate systems that bear that relation to some other admissible co-ordinate system
are themselves admissible. We could take a ‘heavy duty platonist’ view of admissibility
as a primitive, non-supervenient relation between physical and mathematical objects. But
this view is prima facie unappealing, and no more compulsory than the corresponding view
about any of the other mixed mathematico-physical predicates that crop up throughout
physics.
absolute motion and rest, to a version that does away with absolute motion
and rest while keeping absolute acceleration. The history of this transition
is complicated by the fact that the formal machinery required for a rigorous
formulation of the latter, namely neo-Newtonian spacetime (Sklar 1974),
was developed only after Newtonian mechanics had already been rejected
for independent reasons. Nevertheless, the expert consensus is that the
banishment of absolute motion and rest is a major theoretical improvement.
And the standard way of formulating the neo-Newtonian theory is to claim
that the equations of Newtonian mechanics hold in every inertial frame—
that is, in every co-ordinate system that fits the intrinsic geometry of the
spacetime in a specified way.
(An even more dramatic version of this sort of transition occurs with
gauge-symmetric field theories. As standardly formulated, these theories
speak of certain fields, understood as functions from points to geometric
objects of some sort; but it is understood that by changing these functions
in certain ways—for example, by adding any divergence-free vector field to
the electromagnetic potential—one gets something that can be understood
as ‘an equivalent description of the same situation’, analogous to a change
of co-ordinates. Sometimes, in dealing with a particular problem, one will
fix on a particular gauge, just as one might fix on particular co-ordinates.
But much of the time one does not do this; in these cases, talk about a gauge-
symmetric field like ‘the electromagnetic potential 4-vector’ is understood
as governed by a tacit initial universal quantifier over ‘admissible’ fields of
the relevant kind.)
Admittedly, in all these examples, it has turned out not to be necessary
to formulate the theory as a universal quantification over co-ordinate sys-
tems or gauges. Modern differential geometry makes possible ‘co-ordinate
free’ statements of basic physical laws; co-ordinate systems still play a role,
but only at the foundations, where the distinction between admissible and
inadmissible co-ordinate systems features in the definitions of differential
manifolds, smooth functions, vector fields, fibre bundles, etc. This is un-
doubtedly an important theoretical advance. But we must not overstate its
significance. The physics community was happy with co-ordinate-based
formulations when these were the only ones available; and they are still
dominant, outside some specialised contexts where foundational questions
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loom large. A crucial property of the notation used in co-ordinate-free
statements is the fact that equations involving co-ordinates equations can
be read transparently off the co-ordinate-free ones. Even the most fervent
apostles of the co-ordinate-free approach do not think that it saved us from
having to believe in a single privileged co-ordinate system.
These data help to confirm the hypothesis that existential quantification
as such is a distinctive source of badness. Weakening a theory by ‘exis-
tentially quantifying out’ some putatively structure-characterising pred-
icates makes it worse. By contrast, in those special cases where one can
weaken a theory by ‘universally quantifying out’ some putatively structure-
characterising predicates, the result is often an improvement on the orig-
inal. Together with the observation that the operations of ‘existentially
quantifying out’ and ‘embedding within a possibility operator’ seem to
make for badness in the same way, this provides some reason to think that
the operation of ‘embedding within a necessity operator’ is like the oper-
ation ‘universally quantifying out’ in not making for theoretical badness,
even in the special cases where its effect is to weaken the original theory.
Here is a toy theory of how these asymmetries might work. The badness
of a theory increases with the number of symbols it takes to express the
theory, in an appropriately canonical language. But the rate of increase
is much greater within formulae governed by existential quantifiers and
possibility operators. Or to be more precise: it is greater within formulae
governed by existential quantifiers and possibility operators which occur in
positive contexts, and within formulae governed by universal quantifiers
and necessity operators which occur in negative contexts. (We don’t want to
be able to make a theory better by replacing ∃with ∼∀∼ , or^with ∼∼ .)
Thus, in general one can improve a theory by replacing a long existential
quantification ‘∃xφ(x)’ with a conjunction of the form ‘∃xψ(x) ∧ ∀x(ψ(x) ⊃
φ(x))’, where ψ is considerably shorter than φ. This toy theory inherits
most of the defects of symbol-counting as a measure of the epistemically
important notion of simplicity. But I hope that a more plausible measure
of simplicity could be tweaked in a similar way, so as to make complexity
within the scope of existential quantifiers contribute more to badness than
complexity elsewhere.
7 What about M♦?
As noted in section 3, the claim that T is empirically equivalent to T
depends on the assumption that M♦ is a priori:
(M♦) Possibly, the concrete realm is just as it in fact is, and M.
If M♦ is a priori, we can help ourselves to it for free in deriving empirical
consequences from T, just as we can help ourselves to theorems of clas-
sical logic, even very complex ones; it does not have to be counted as part
of the total package to which we apply our syntactic tests for theoretical
badness. But is it a priori? I quite like the idea that that for such claims we
can know a priori that there is no relevant gap between logical and meta-
physical possibility, or between metaphysical possibility and metaphysical
consistency with the truth about the concrete world, so that if we could
know a priori that M is logically consistent, we could deduce M♦. But even
if I am right about this, and even if the logical consistency of M is in some
sense a logical truth, one might well balk at the idea that our justification
for believing it is a matter of deductive rationality alone. The logical con-
sistency of a theory like ZFCU is clearly epistemologically problematic in a
way that theorems of predicate logic, even complex ones, are not. Indeed,
if we are justified in believing ZFCU to be consistent at all, part of the story
about why we are so justified involves the empirical fact that so far no-one
has succeeded in deriving a contradiction from it. This seems to be within
the sphere of inductive rationality: the hypothesis that ZFCU is consistent
is supported by its constituting a good explanation of our failure to derive
contradictions from it. If so, we do not get to help ourselves to M♦ for free.
And that is a worry, because the logical form of M♦ is the very same as that
of T♦ and T, which we found to be a source of badness. If we need to posit
M♦ as part of an explanation of some empirical phenomena—either the
wide range of empirical phenomena putatively explained by T, or merely
our failure to derive contradictions from M—doesn’t the analogy with T
show that the explanation in question is a bad one?
Two responses to this objection seem promising to me. The first response
concedes that M♦ needs to be included along with T in the total package
of theory for the purposes of applying IBE, but insists that, despite sharing
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a logical form with T♦ and T, M♦ is nevertheless much better than them,
since M is so much simpler than the total physical theory T to which T♦ and
T apply their possibility operators. The contrast in simplicity is genuine:
while laws in physics sometimes admit of very compact statements, these
invariably involve many expressions whose definitions have been carefully
crafted to allow for such compactness. And the toy theory of section 6
predicts that simplicity matters: the idea is that complexity is worse within
the scope of an existential quantifier or possibility operator, so that one
does better the more of the meat of one’s theory one manages to exclude
from such contexts.
The example of co-ordinate systems is helpful here. If a theory that
begins ‘For every admissible co-ordinate system. . . ’ is to have any empiri-
cally interesting consequences, it will need to be combined with something
that entails that there is at least one admissible co-ordinate system. In some
especially nice cases, like Euclidean geometry, we can find geometric ax-
ioms which do entail this (given an appropriate definition of ‘admissible’)
without being at all syntactically analogous to bad existentially quantified
theories. But in other cases, we are still left with a residual existential
quantification governing something somewhat complex, albeit much less
complex than the original theory. For example, in standard treatments of
differential geometry it is a basic axiom that for every point there is some
admissible assignment of co-ordinates (in Rn) to points in a neighbourhood
of that point. And unless we go with an implausible conception of admissi-
bility as a primitive property of co-ordinate systems, its definition in terms
of intrinsic geometric relations holding among points of space is bound
to introduce a certain amount of complexity. Nevertheless, these theories
are explanatorily good: no one thinks that there are any epistemic advan-
tages to be gained by positing a new piece of fundamental structure that
assigns to each point a unique privileged local co-ordinate system around
that point. So however we end up implementing the idea that existential
quantification is a distinctive source of badness, the existential quantifica-
tion in ‘for each point, there is an admissible co-ordinate system around
that point’ had better not turn out to make for too much badness. If our
grouping of possibility operators together with existential quantifiers is on
the right lines, then, we shouldn’t just throw up our hands whenever we
see something with the logical form M♦ shares with T♦ and T. Rather, we
should try to take considerations of simplicity into account, being guided
as much as we can by analogies such as the one with co-ordinate systems.39
The second response is less concessive. Even if it is recognised that
empirical considerations sometimes play a role in explaining why it is rea-
sonable for us to believe logical truths, perhaps we should not expect the
rules that seem to govern good inductive reasoning about logically contin-
gent matters to carry over to the realm of the logically necessary. For there
is something odd about the thought that we could be justified in believ-
ing something logically contingent (for instance, that there are models of
ZFCU) in virtue of its recognisably entails something (for instance, that there
are no valid derivations of contradictions from the axioms of ZFCU) which
is in fact a logical truth, hence entailed by everything. Our limited ability
to recognise certain kinds of logical truths as such seems like a reason for
diffidence and caution: it would be strange if it rationally required us to
be more opinionated about some logically contingent matters. Perhaps,
then, we should understand our conclusions about explanatory goodness
as telling us in the first instance about the standards an extremely idealised
kind of inductive reasoning, whose prerequisites include being fully con-
fident of all logical truths, including truths about logical consistency. If so,
we should not expect them to play the same role in an account of good
inductive reasoning at a more humanly attainable level—about how we
should best accommodate our limitations, such as our inability reliably to
distinguish logical truths from nonlogical ones.
8 Other theoretical virtues
Burgess and Rosen (1997: §III.C.1.a) put forth the following argument for
the theoretical badness of a wide range of nominalistic theories. Famil-
39It may be too that such examples show that theories that require the initial quantifier
order ∀∃, as in ‘for every point, there is an admissible co-ordinate system around that
point’, are ceteris paribus better than theories with an initial ∃. If there is anything true in
this vicinity, it is good news for us: to the extent M♦ is plausible, the stronger claim that
necessarily it is possible for the concrete realm to be just as it in fact is while M is true—
in other words, that every world is concretely indiscernible from some M-world—is also
plausible, and could be used instead of M♦ in our total theoretical package.
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iarity, perspicuity and fruitfulness are features that make scientists favour a
theory, other things being equal. So they are theoretical virtues: inductive
reasoning that favours theories that have them is, other things being equal,
good reasoning. But the nominalistic theories under consideration lack
these virtues. And other things are close enough to being equal. Hence the
nominalistic theories are worse than the theories they aim to supplant.
For various reasons, I am not close to being convinced by this argument,
at least as applied to theories like T. Here are some of the reasons.
(i) I find it implausible that considerations like ‘familiarity’ play any
role in the theory of ideal inductive reasoning. Normally, the facts
about the order in which theories are invented have no eviden-
tial bearing on which theories are true; a perfect reasoner, whose
degrees of belief fit the evidence, would thus treat these facts as
irrelevant. Of course, real human beings, including scientists,
are prone to favour the theories they encounter first over newly
invented alternatives. And this conservative bias is not a mere
defect, but makes sense given our other limitations. Since we
don’t have the time or ability to think through each theory for
ourselves, we can legitimately use our knowledge of a theory’s
origins and history as a shortcut, and hold new theories in suspi-
cion even when we haven’t yet been able to uncover any intrinsic
problems with them. But this won’t matter if we are concerned
with questions about how ideal inductive reasoning works.40
What’s the point of investigating ideal rationality, if the claim
that ideal inductive reasoning does not require belief in the ex-
istence of mathematical entities is consistent with the claim that
the best kind of inductive reasoning available to human beings
does require such a belief? —Well, what’s the point in ever being
concerned with questions about normative ideals? The answer, I
think, lies in some principle like the following: if we oughtnon-ideal
to believe that we oughtideal to believe that P, then we oughtnon-ideal
40Similar remarks apply to perspicuity and fruitfulness, if these are construed in a way
that ties them closely to the contingent capacities of human beings.
to believe that P.41
(ii) There may be some good sense in which Field-style nominalis-
tic theories are less ‘fruitful’—less capable of being patched up
or extended to account for new phenomena—than the platonistic
theories they replace; there is the risk that a small-looking change
to the platonistic theory will generate a completely new set of
difficulties for the reconstruction project. But it is hard to think
of a sense of ‘fruitfulness’ on which T could be said to be less
fruitful than T, since there is such an obvious one-to-one corre-
spondence between modifications we might perform on T and the
corresponding modifications on T.
(iii) Of course, if we decided to believe only T rather than some
platonistic T, there would be no need for us to go around pro-
nouncing the ‘Necessarily, if the concrete realm is just as it in fact
is and M, then. . . ’ all the time, or forming conscious mental repre-
sentations of it. It would naturally fade into the background, and
the detailed business of scientific theory-construction and com-
munication could take place in exactly the same way as before.
This sort of thing is common in scientific practice: long stretches
of thought and discourse are implicitly governed by assumptions
which many competent practitioners would not readily be able to
make explicit. All of this makes it hard to get the charge of lack of
‘perspicuity’ to stick.
(iv) Suppose I am right in thinking that I understand fundamental
meanings for quantifiers which are different from the meanings
they express in ordinary scientific contexts. No matter how se-
riously we take virtues like familiarity, they are not going to be
much help in drawing epistemic distinctions between theories
expressed using fundamental quantifiers—all such theories are
pretty unfamiliar, awkward to work with, etc.
41And likewise if we oughtnon-ideal to believe that we oughtideal not to believe that P, then
we oughtnon-ideal not to believe that P.
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Another putative virtue that might be thought to favour T over T is
that of ideological economy. This pair of theories might seem perfectly to
exemplify Quine’s famous tradeoff between ontology and ideology; and
if one thinks in these terms, trading in T’s distinctive ideology (modal
operators, including whatever is required to make sense of restrictors like
‘the concrete realm is just as it in fact is’) for T’s ontology (mathematics)
might seem a benefit. But this can’t be the right way to think. We just do
understand modal operators: a blank rejection of all modal claims is not a
serious theoretical option. And because of this, we can just see, at least in
the central cases of interest, that if T is true, T must also be true.42 It is
mysterious how the metaphor of economy could apply in such a case: its
natural use is in making comparisons between competing theories.
The notion of ideological economy does feature in an important class of
arguments from T to the claim that there are abstract objects of some sort.
These arguments work by exhibiting some general metaphysical analysis of
modal operators like those used in T, under which T and/or M♦ turn out
to require the existence of abstract objects, such as possible worlds. It is
claimed that the unless the analysis in question is accepted, we will have to
be committed to the ideologically uneconomical view that the modal opera-
tors are ‘metaphysically primitive’, a brute addition to the overall structure
of reality on a par with the structures investigated by fundamental physics.
Evaluating this kind of argument is a big task. For one thing, it is far from
clear how to understand the notion of metaphysical primitiveness in such
a way as to make room for a debate whether metaphysical possibility and
necessity are primitive. (Nominalists can easily accept that modal facts su-
pervene on the non-modally-specified facts; is this enough for them not to be
primitive?) For another thing, it is far from obvious that invoking abstract
ontology lets one avoid taking modality as primitive.43 I won’t attempt
42I am abstracting away here from the worries discussed in section 7
43While metaphysical possibility and necessity are tricky, it is easier to see how abstract
ontologies containing facts, propositions, or possible worlds might help with the analysis
of the expression ‘the concrete realm is just as it in fact is’. But nominalists are not forced to
take this expression as metaphysically primitive. One strategy is to metaphysically analyse
it as a conjunction, whose first conjunct says that everything exists that in fact exists, and
whose remaining conjuncts are of the form ∀x1 . . . xn(Rx1 . . . xn ↔ ↓Rx1 . . . xn), where R is
some metaphysically primitive physical predicate. (↓ is the Hodes ‘backspace’ operator:
this task here. I just want to point out that this kind of argument is quite
different from the argument we have been concerned with, which purports
to establish the existence of abstract entities using an inductive inference
that essentially involves our specific, contingent evidence, as opposed to
general considerations that would apply in the same way no matter what
our evidence had been like.44
9 Objections
(i) Theories about simplicity
Section 5 claimed that there is no way to fill in the BLAH in T with
something comparable with M in terms of simplicity, etc., in such a way as to
do for subatomic particles or some other category of physical unobservables
what T does for numbers. What about something like Ts?
(Ts) Necessarily, if the laws are as simple as they could be given the
facts about observables, T.
This has the same consequences for observables as T. And typically, when
T is itself simple, it will be reasonable to be confident that Ts is true if T is.
By using simplicity in this way within the theory, one can also formulate
universally quantified replacements for the existentially quantified theories
we considered in section 6:
see note 13 above). The first conjunct is tricky to make sense of in a way that does not
make it redundant; one way to do so would require another new operator that ‘undoes’ the
effect of ‘in fact’. Must nominalists take these operators as metaphysically primitive? Not
if they are the kind of nominalists who can tolerate a bit of second-order quantification—
then they can analyse a claim like ‘^(∀x1∀x2(Rx1x2 ↔ ↓Rx1x2) ∧ T)’ as ∃X(∀x1x2(Rx1x2 ↔
Xx1x2) ∧ ^(∀x1x2(Rx1x2 ↔ Xx1x2) ∧ T)), where the second-order variables are understood
as ‘rigid’. Rigid second-order quantification likewise lets us analyse ‘Possibly, everything
exists that in fact exists and T’, as ‘∃X(∀x(x = x ↔ Xx) ∧ ^∃Y(∀x(Xx ↔ Yx) ∧ T))’. (See
Hodes 1984.)
44Sider (MS) develops a worked-out way of talking about ideological economy in terms
of what I was calling ‘metaphysical primitiveness’, and uses it to argue for the existence of
sets.
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(T∀s) On every topologically admissible co-ordinate system 〈x, y, z, t〉
which permits a maximally simple statement of the laws,
T(x, y, z, t).45
The challenge for me is to explain why Ts and T∀s are bad in a way that
doesn’t impugn T.
The challenge isn’t so hard to meet. The first thing to observe is that the
notion of simplicity that features in these theories is itself quite complex
(on each of its precisifications), and needs to be for Ts and T∀s to be at all
plausible. And the second thing to observe is that this complexity is itself
embedded in the scope of a an existential quantifier or possibility-operator,
in a positive context, thanks to the quantification implicit in the notion of
maximal simplicity. This can be seen easily in the case of T∀s, which can be
spelled out as follows:
For every topologically admissible co-ordinate system 〈x, y, z, t〉:
either there is a topologically admissible 〈x′, y′, z′, t′〉 which per-
mits a simpler statement of the laws than 〈x, y, z, t〉 does, or else
T(x, y, z, t).
The same structure can be seen in Ts if we paraphrase it in terms of possible
worlds:
For every world w where the observable realm is just as it in fact
is: either some world w′ where the observable realm is just as it
in fact is has simpler laws than w, or T is true at w.
Thus I doubt that explaining the badness of Ts and T∀s requires any new
insights beyond those contained in the toy theory of section 6.
(ii) Semantic ascent
Another suggestion for doing without possibility-operators or existential
quantifiers is to use the resources of proof-theory. We could replace Twith
something like this:
45Indeed, under a ‘best system’ analysis of geometric predicates that go beyond the
favoured minimal base (in this case, topology), T itself will turn out to be equivalent to
something like T∀s.
(T `) Whenever there is a valid derivation whose only premise is ‘T’
and whose conclusion is a sentence S that is entirely about ob-
servable matters, S is true.
Making this precise is a big task; but if we do it properly T ` will entail
every claim about the observable world that can derived from T.46 Thus
T ` must be a bad theory, for the same reasons as T.47 How are we to
explain the badness of T `? Filling in the definitions of derivation and
truth, and replacing the quote-name ‘T’ with a syntactic description of a
sentence expressing T will leave us with something quite complex by any
reasonable standard. But if we are careful, it will be possible to keep much
of this complexity—in particular, the complexity required for the syntactic
description of ‘T’—out of the scope of existential quantifiers.
The same kind of problem arises in a more straightforward way for
existentially quantified theories like those considered in section 6. Surely
on any sensible account of theoretical goodness, the transition from T to
a theory that says that ‘T’ is true should never count as an improvement.
But while a statement of the latter theory in fundamental terms will be
long and intuitively quite complex, its general logical form will be much
the same irrespective of whether the existential quantifications in the T we
started with were complicated or simple.
There is some temptation to give up the high level of abstraction I have
been looking for in an account of theoretical goodness, and admit special-
purpose principles that apply only to theories involving semantic ascent.
But, given the multifarious forms that a ‘syntax’ might take, it is hard to
see how such principles could be stated in a way that would give them
sufficient generality. So I hope that these cases can be dealt without in-
troducing anything beyond general considerations of complexity into an
account of theoretical badness. (I note, for example, that any theory that
mentions some particular sentence by means of a description of its syntax
46I don’t think we will need to worry about the semantic paradoxes: since the conclusion
is only concerned with truths entirely about the observable realm, we can understand ‘S
is true’ to mean that S is true in a set-sized model whose domain is the set of observable
objects, which interprets ‘red’ as standing for the set of observable red things, and so on.
47Unless T is first-order, T ` will not be quite as strong as T; but I can’t see why this
would matter.
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will have to contain many more quantifiers than that sentence itself does.)
Given the point in the previous paragraph, this means that the transition
from T to the theory that ‘T’ is true will not always be equally deleterious:
we lose less if we start with a bad, existentially quantified theory than we
do when we start with a universally quantified theory of equal syntactic
complexity. But I don’t see that that should matter, provided that what we
end up with is always worse than what we started with.
In any case, while these cases may be problematic for the toy theory of
section 6 and some of its elaborations, they do not threaten the central point
of my defence of T. However we end up explains the badness of T `, there
is no reason at all to fear that the explanation will in any way impugn T.
(iii) Differential equations
Does my hypothesis that complexity is always worse when it is in the
scope of existential quantifiers stand up in the light of examples from
actual science? I wish I knew. One worry I have thought about arises
from the fact that our most basic physical theories are, or centrally involve,
differential equations. Given the familiar epsilon-delta definition of the
derivative operator, any differential equation will reduce under analysis to
some rather complex formula with an initial string of universal quantifiers
followed by a string of existential quantifiers. Won’t my suggestion have
the absurd consequence that these theories are no good?
Well, this consequence wouldn’t be absurd if we could show these theo-
ries to be logically equivalent to some other theories with less complexity in
the scope of existential quantifiers. For the notion of badness I am working
with, insofar as it cares about fine-grained distinctions between logically
equivalent theories, seems to go beyond any concept of explanatory qual-
ity that we antecedently understand. I will be happy if I can get the right
results about what it would be reasonable to believe given this or that
evidence.
In the case of differential equations, it does seem possible to restate the
theories so as to eliminate the problem. Instead of replacing each use of
a differential operator with its epsilon-delta analysis, we can regard the
derivative operator as a variable bound by a universal quantifier: ‘for
each operator d on such-and-such space of functions which is a derivative
operator according to the epsilon-delta definition, . . . d . . .’. By expressing
things this way, we can keep the meat of the differential equations outside
the scope of any existential quantifier.
(iv) Fundamental properties
When we state physical theories, we give names to the physically fun-
damental properties and relations that feature in them: ‘mass’, ‘charge’,
‘electronhood’, etc. But according to Ramsey, Carnap and Lewis, these
names are disguised descriptions. When we state the theory, we are really
saying nothing more than that there are some properties that (uniquely?)
play such-and-such structural roles. (The roles need not be specified en-
tirely in observational terms: for Lewis, for example, it will include the
specification that the properties and relations that play it are natural ones.)
So, on this view, even our best theories in physics will be revealed, under
analysis, to have the allegedly problematic structure of ‘one big existential
quantification’.48
One response to the objection is simply to deny that theoretical terms are
disguised descriptions. Kripke’s arguments against the view that proper
names are disguised descriptions seem to work just as well against the
corresponding view about theoretical terms.
The problem with this response is that it is hard to see how it could mat-
ter. Suppose the practice of introducing names for properties and relations
had never occurred to us. Instead of introducing names for properties like
electronhood, we might confined ourselves to describing them as the occu-
pants of some theoretical role. While such a practice might be inconvenient
in various ways, it is implausible to think that it would severely diminish
our ability to provide good explanations in physics.
If the ability to introduce a name to refer to something instead of denoting
it using quantifiers did matter in the way it would have to for this response
to work, couldn’t those who want to avoid positing some bit of hidden
structure use the same strategy to avoid having to rely on theories with
48This will also be true under ‘structural strategy’ for giving nominalistic analyses of
predicates like ‘electron’ discussed in Dorr 2007: §4.ii.
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complicated existential quantifications? But clearly there is no explanatory
progress to be made by replacing the theory that there is some function from
objects to numbers that uniquely plays the ‘charge’ role with the theory that
Clyde is such a function, where the name ‘Clyde’ was introduced by the
stipulation that it refers to the function that uniquely plays the charge role.
The introduction of the name only seems like progress if we think that our
ability to name the function derives from its representing some kind of
natural, intrinsic structure.
The following response seems more promising to me. Even if we think
of theories in fundamental physics as involving existential quantification
over natural properties, if these theories are good candidates to be the best
explanation of our evidence, they will include clauses which state that the
natural properties they talk about are the only natural properties there are.
Because of this, the theories will be equivalent to conjunctions with one
relatively simple, existentially quantified conjunct, which merely says how
many natural properties and relations there are, and one more complicated
universally quantified conjunct, which describes the structural roles played
any natural properties and relations there might be. In the simplest case,
imagine a theory according to which there is only one natural property and
one natural binary relation. We could represent it as a single existential
quantification:
∃p∃r(p is the only natural property∧ ris the only natural binary
relation∧T(p, r)).
But we can also state it as a conjunction:
∃p∃r(p is the only natural property∧ ris the only natural binary
relation)∧
∀p∀r((p is a natural property∧ r is a natural relation) ⊃ T(p, r)).
In the more general case, the first conjunct may say something like ‘there
are two natural properties and two natural binary relations’. Then the
second conjunct will need to be more complex:
Whenever p1 and p2 are distinct natural properties and r1 andr2 are
distinct natural relations, either T(p1, p2, r1, r2), or T(p2, p1, r1, r2),
or T(p1, p2, r2, r1), or T(p2, p1, r2, r1).
As the number of properties and relations increases, the number of dis-
juncts we need will increase factorially. If we are taking length of formulae
as a measure of complexity, this will seem very worrying. But it is plau-
sible that in this case symbol-counting fails quite badly as a measure of
complexity. Intuitively, a long disjunction whose disjuncts are all and only
the formulae generated from some simple combinatorial principle seems
far less complex than a much shorter disjunction with miscellaneous, unre-
lated disjuncts. Consider how long the first-order translations of sentences
involving numerical quantifiers quickly get, while remaining intuitively
quite simple.49
In fact, this example brings out the surprising explanatory power of the
idea that big existential quantifications are a distinctive source of theoreti-
cal badness. It is a commonplace—a version of Ockham’s Razor—that we
should not attribute more structure to the world than we require for our
explanations. If we find that we only need to posit eight natural proper-
ties and three natural relations to explain all our evidence, we should be
pretty confident that there are not any additional ‘junk’ natural properties
or relations, marking out joints in nature that play no role in explaining
anything we know about. But why should a theory that rules out ‘junk
structure’ be better than a theory that simply leaves the question open?
This is not explained by the thought that simpler theories are better. A
simple theory doesn’t have to entail that the world is in any sense simple:
it could leave it open how simple the world is. But the idea that big exis-
tential quantification are bad provides a neat answer. A theory that rules
out junk structure will be logically equivalent to a conjunction in which the
existentially quantified conjunct is relatively simple, whereas a theory that
leaves it open how much junk structure there is will only be statable as a
big existential quantification. Other applications of Ockham’s razor to rule
out other kinds of ‘junk’ can be accounted for in a similar way.50
49Moreover, the best theories will, I think, tend to posit few natural properties of each
adicity; they will have lots of symmetries of the kind that would make many of the dis-
juncts logically redundant; and where the posited natural properties are not related by
symmetries, they may be related by simple asymmetries that we can use to restrict the
universal quantifier in the second conjunct, doing away with the need for the disjunction
of permutations.
50Thanks to Antony Eagle, Hartry Field, Anandi Hattiangadi, John Hawthorne, Anna
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